WHAT WAS DONE : The government in exile, that had led the war of liberation, did not put any serious thought in record, about what would be its policy regarding war criminals and collaborators. Though, virtually from the day one, the leaderships had clear ideas about Pakistan's genocidal plans, and in its Declaration to form new government on 17 April 1971; they based their claims and referred to ongoing genocide as many as four times in that Declaration.
As a result, after liberation, on 16 December 1971, the new leadership was seen lacking any credible strategy to deal with the war criminals. What happened first, was the manifestation of mob anger, inherently indiscriminately. The new government tried to hold the public passion by repeated public announcements on radio not to take the law in hand, which was largely ignored. The Biharis, those by and large, aligned their fate with Pakistani soldiers, too faced public wrath.
The new government, after initial settlement, issued executive orders to arrest the collaborators. The Pakistani military, by then, went under Indian command and became Prisoners of War. Police carried out most of the arrests of the collaborators. Police also arrested member of the collaborating civilian government that aided the Pakistani genocidal army.
Even today, we do not find any outlined plan how to deal with the war criminals, and when it came up, the strategy had a fatal flaw. The government separated the local 'collaborators' and the 'Pakistani Army', though both carried out the genocide in unison.
Firstly, a law was promulgated by the government, known as Bangladesh Collaborators (Special Tribunals) Order, 1972, which provided only a new forum, but was asked to deal with the aftermath of a revolutionary situation with the peacetime prevailing legal norms. That was totally unsuitable for such an extra-ordinary situation.
The law also did not provide any other forms of punishment, other than imprisonment or death, like deprivation of civil and political rights. Not every collaborator actively carried out criminal acts of genocide, he could have engaged in activities that ought to have forfeited his future political rights, like voting or participation in political activities.
Much later, in July 1973, the Parliament legislated International Crimes (Tribunals) Acts, 1973, targeted largely to the members of the armed forces of Pakistan. The Act envisaged setting up Special Tribunal, which however, never materialised.
By the time the Awami League government was overthrown in a bloody military coup in 1975, the issues of war criminals and the collaborators were virtually settled. All the Pakistani POWs were returned and local collaborators received unilateral amnesty without any corresponding commitment.
Until around 1990, the voices of the victims did not get any platform. A formidable lady and mother of a victim, Jahanara Imam, took the responsibility onto herself. In her words, "Prompted by our commitment to the values of the liberation war and love for our country and aggrieved by the failure of the government to try the war criminals", the 'National Co-ordinating Committee for Realisation of Bangladesh Liberation War Ideals and Trial of Bangladesh War Criminals of 1971' was formed. Under its auspices, the symbolic public trial of Golam Azam was held.
The Co-ordinating Committee decided to unearth "evidence of complicity of all collaborators in war crimes, crimes against humanity, killings and other activities". It had set up an investigative body, National People's Enquiry Commission, to probe against selected individuals. The Commission had published two reports on sixteen criminals and collaborators, and by 26 March 1996, was supposed to publish report on another seven persons, that was never done.
Even the qualities of the Commission's reports were disappointing, and lacking details for any possible criminal prosecution.
An institution, Liberation War Museum was set up by some dedicated individuals to preserve the history of liberation. This has now turned into an excellent centre of exhibits on Bangladesh liberation war.
With limited resources, but for the same goals, a number of other organisations have campaigned to put the war criminals and collaborators on trial. They mounted high profile campaigns when Pakistani government leaders visited Bangladesh or players came to play. One such organisation is the Movement for the Trail of War Criminals of 1971.
Again, what is seen here is incoherent, piecemeal and largely individual activism, which is probably going to lead the issues to nowhere. There are not even any effective networking between various organisations and activists.
WHAT SHOULD BE DONE : Mrs.Jahanara Imam's frustration still persists. The government, headed by the party that led the liberation war continues to fail to resolve the past, either by holding trials of the war criminals or otherwise.
The government has extended co-operation, and rightly so, by allowing the Army to help exhumation process, but is unable or unwilling to go further. The government, however, deserved thanks for such co-operation, but its inability to move in the right direction and to correct mistakes of the past governments are highly disappointing.
Thus, it's again the non-government actors to continue and invigorate the moves, but first of all, appropriate strategy has to be devised to achieve any meaningful success. And sine qua non for such a strategy is wide consultation between the organisations and individuals involved in the process. Only by extensive consultation, we could possibly expect to proceed ahead in a significant way.
I have tried to outline probable options in some of my articles,. Here, too, I shall attempt to elaborate further on aspects of the strategy to deal with the past.
DESIRABLE AND ACHIEVABLE: In an ideal world, all the Pakistani soldiers, those who surrendered and others, who participated in genocide but left before December 16, and all the local collaborators, ought to have been brought to the book. That would have been highly desirable, but equally unrealistic. Putting on hundreds and thousands on some form of trial was not possible then, nor even now.
Thus the strategy, first of all, should be achievable. For example, in respect of trial of war criminals is still possible, by putting some on trial. The job then would be to identify the principal perpetrators and collaborators. Subsequently by working hard, to bring them before trial, either in national, foreign or international forums.