39. We consider this is the most significant message of all the various messages that we have referred to and think it necessary to make some analysis of it. In the first place it might be noticed that it is an unclassified message. i.e. it was sent in clear and was, therefore, capable of being listened to and, probably was listened to by India, as indeed by any other country. N itself and without reference to any other factor this alone must have had disastrous effect. The United Nations Security Council was in session, but it is difficult to see how we could with any confidence expect to secure any success there with this open confession of our weakness and clear willingness to accept any terms. Even those nations upon whose help we could have in some degree relied were hardly able to help after this.
40. Besides this important effect on Pakistan's case in the United Nation we think that it might we have prompted General Manekshaw to insist upon a surrender even though General Niazi was only proposing a cease-fire.
41. We have not been able to understand how such an important message came to be unclassified. Some mistake has occurred for it is both the duty of the Staff Officers ad that of the signal centre to ensure that some classification is given. The world "clear" although we have used it is not a classification used and when we have used it we mean only that bearing no classification it is , as we would put it in non-technical language, is clear.
42. The fact that it was unclassified also led to the feeling in the mind of those in Dacca that it might not be an authentic message but a hoax. Quite naturally, therefore, the Commander wanted to verify this and also to be sure whether this was meant to be surrender. It would be profitable to reproduced the following passage from General Niazi's written statement to us:
"This signal being unclassified was probably intercepted by the Indians in clear. As a first reaction we thought that it might be an Indian plant. However, I wanted to confirm its authenticity and also its implications:-
A. I was not fighting an independent war as commander of an independent army of a different country. I wanted to check about the overall GHO plan or cease-fire with India and is terms etc.
B. If I was to negotiate my independent cease-fire, I would not be from a position of strength. It would tantamount to surrender.
Brigadier Janjua on request from my COS confirmed that this signal was meant to be UNCLAS on telephone. By about noon 14 December i.e. 9 hours after the receipt of the President's signal, I could get through to the CGS, Lt. Gen Gul Hassan Khan, and told him about the order of the President. He asked me as to what signal and what cease-fire or surrender I was talking about. When I explained to him he replied that he did not know about this order and since the President had issued these orders, I should talk to him and he then banged the telephone.
Earlier in the day, 14th December 1971, Governor A M Malik talked to me on telephone about the President's order. I told him that I had asked for clarification of the signal from the GHQ. He asked me whether I am going to agree to stopping the war or not. I replied him that I still had every intention to continue fighting. I heard about Governor's resignation in the afternoon and after strafing of the Government House same day he moved to Hotel Intercontinental. With him moved his ministers and all civil and police officers. He wrote me a letter on the subject on 15th December as under:-

"My dear Niazi,
May I know if any action has been taken, from your side, on PAK ARMY Signal No.G-0013 dated 14-12-71 from the President to you and to me as the Governor. This message clearly said " you should take all necessary measures to stop the fighting and preserve the lives of all armed forces personnel, all those from West Pakistan and all loyal element." The signal also says "you have now reached a stage where further resistance is no longer humanly possible nor will it serve any useful purpose." Hostility is still continuing and loss of life and disaster continue. I request you to do the needful.
With regards.
Yours Sincerely,
A.M. Malik
Phone 25291-12"

43. It is a sad reflection on the state of affairs then prevailing at Rawalpindi, though in view of what we have said in the Main Report his can only be now a side light --, that at this critical juncture the Commander could not immediately get through on the telephone to the Chief of Staff, much less the President. The only person to whom he could speak immediately was Brigadier Janjua who, however, confirmed that the signal was meant to be unclassified. Not until about noon could the Commander speak even to the Chief of the General Staff who apparently did not even know what orders were being talked about. It does not seem that at any time the Commander could speak to the President himself and the highest hat he could reach was only the Chief of Staff and that not until the evening of the 14th and the Chief of Staff, according to General Niazi, merely sad "act accordingly" and the Air Commander-in-Chief, Ali Marshall M. Rahim Khan also insisted that the President's order be obeyed.